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Previously I examined the standard preference-based conception of the
atomistic individual in neoclassical economics [Davis (2003c)], and
argued that this conception fails two basic identity tests that are reasonable to require of any viable conception of the individual as an independent economic agent. From a different perspective, namely, the l970s
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu (SMDJ results, it has been shown that the
neoclassical conception of the atomistic individual is problematic in that
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it cannot support the standard microfoundations explanation of aggregate economic behavior in markets, such as is employed in comparative
static analysis [Kirman (1989); Rizvi (1994)) . One consequence of the
latter development has been a number of efforts to re-conceptualize individual economic agents as actively interacting with one another, rather
than as simply responding indirectly and passively to one another through
the mechanism of the price system. One new research programme which
does this investigares economies as complex adaptive systems in which
aggregate and individual economic behavior are mutually influencing,
unlike in Walrasian, methodological individualist models which rather
sum across independent individuals as a means of explaining aggregate
market behavior as fully a product of individual behavior. At the same
time, in contrast to most game theory models in which interaction tends
to be pervasive in the sense that players need to know each other's (likely)
strategies, this research programme understands individual interaction
to be limited in scope in that individuals only interact with select sets of
individuals, or individuals interact in local nerworks or neighborhoods
that are subsets of larger economies. In the limit, this more narrow sort
of interaction might be pairwise, as in Alan Kirman's analysis of loyalty
relationships between individual buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish
market, which shows how a market can exhibir simple aggregate properties (such as down-sloping demand) without individuals also exhibiting the same type of behavior [Kirman (200 1)].
One challenge that this research programme faces is whether it can
develop an explanation of individual behavior underlying individual interaction and the observed aggregate properties of markets. lndeed, if the
standard neoclassical conception of the independent individual no longer applies, and if aggregate properties of markets can be explained in
terms of individual interaction, then can it still be said that individuals
are distinct economic agents, or should we conclude that groups of individuals in networks are the relevant economic agents? Of course not only
has economics historically made explanation of individual behavior central, but one also seems to presuppose that individuals are distinct economic agents when one asserts that individuals interact. So this question
might be better re-phrased to ask whether the particular conception of
the individual interacting with other individuals in networks can still be
said to satisfy basic identity tests that may be reasonably required of any
conception of the individual as a distinct economic agents. The two tests
that l have previously applied to the neoclassical conception are (i) the
individuation test lwhether individuals in a given conception can be
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shown to be distinct and independenr of one another) and (ii) the reidentification test (whether individuals shown to be distinct when identified in sorne way can be re-identified in that same way across a process
of change that may alter many of their other characteristics). These two
tests are meant to capture how individual economic agents can be said to
ha ve the equivalent in economic analysis of what philosophers refer to as
personal identity, though 1 emphasize only a 'personal identity' with respect to economic life and not life as a whole. Personal identity concepts,
it should be added, are different than social identity concepts. The laner
generally concern how individuals identify themselves with others in
social groups or simply with social groups. Thus, while individuals in
loyalty relationships may be said to idenrify with those to whom they are
loyal, the question 1 rather attempt to address here is whether in identifying with others they nonetheless still sustain personal identities as distinct individuals. The motivation for this question is a general concern
with establishing the types of agents appropriate to economic analysis.
Thus 1 proceed by asking a skeptical question: were there not a way to
understand how individuals retain a status as distinct agents, might it not
be better for economics to regard groups as economic agents, and give
up its long-standing attention to individuals?
In rhis paper 1 apply both the individuation and re-identification tests
to the conception of the individual implicit in Kirman's account of the
Marseille fish market taken as representative of network analysis, and
then argue that, in contrast to the standard atomistic conception of the
individual in neoclassical economics, the network conception can be
understood to employ a viable conception of distinct, re-identifiable individuals. Thus 1 answer my skeptical question in favor of economics maintaining attention to individuals, though not on the traditional,
methodological individualist view of individuals. 1 take this to be important both for thinking about individuals in economics, and for understanding networks as economic systems in which individual and aggregate
behavior is mutually influencing, where this means employing a more
complex account of economic agency than is curren ti y available in either
individualist or holist frameworks. That is, whereas traditional individualist frameworks too often assume that only individuals are agents and
holist frameworks too often assume that only groups of individuals are
agents, in the network conception both individuals and groups of individuals exercise agency, and moreover do so in a mutually i~fluencing manner. This richer view of agency, it is hoped, will offer points of tangency
with parallel reasoning in contemporary economic sociology.
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The first section of the paper sets out a rationale for identity analysis
of individuals in terms of an analogous relation between personal identity arguments in philosophy and the fixed -point approach to equilibrium
existence proofs in economics. Here 1 attempt to set forth a view of personal identity appropriate to economic analysis that perhaps departs in
one key respect from thinking about personal identity investigated by
many philosophers. The second section of the paper turns to Kirman's
Marseille fish market analysis as a paradigm example of the network
conception ro describe individual behavior in terms of loyalty relationships that develop between individual buyers and sellers. An important
issue his approach raises is, how are we to understand the behavior associated with the reinforcement mechanism he employs to explain loyalty
in his simulation analysis? The third section applies Margaret Gilbert's
philosophical account of loyalty behavior between pairs of individuals
developed in terms of the idea of collective or shared intentions rather
than individual intentions. Central to this account is that shared intentions depend on individuals forming joint commitments to one another
rhat may conflict with their individual goals. The fourth section applies
this collective intentionality analysis to the nerwork conception of individuals to explain interactive individual behavior. This section argues
that both the individuation and re-identification tests necessary to an
identity analysis demonstration that such individuals exist can be said to
be satisfied. The fifth and last section briefly condudes by returning to
the analogy between personal identity arguments in philosophy and equilibrium existence proofs in economics and the position taken in the paper
that establishing the eXistence of individuals and existence of equilibrium
are conjoint projects.

Parallels between Fixed point theorerns and
personal identity analysis 2
I.

Fixed point theorems constitute the primary method employed in economics for establishing the existence of solutions to equilibrium systems
of equations or inequalities [Giocoli (2003 )]. Brouwer-Kakutani-type
fixed point theorems have been used to demonstrate the existence of a
set of equilibrium prices for a Walrasian competitive economy and the

2. This argument is ~lso ad\anced in Do~vis 12003b).
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existence of an equilibrium point of n-tuple strategies in a many-person
non-cooperative game. 3 A fixed point theorem is a mathematical proposition which states that a mapping f that transforms each point x of a set
X toa point f(x) within X has a fixed point x· that is transformed to itsclf,
so that f(x') = x'. Thus a fixed point theorem demonstrates the existence
of sorne system of relationships by anchoring that system in one self-identical relati'onship within that system. This bears important resemblances
to the logic employed in much philosophical personal identity analysis to
establish the existence of a person in terms of one unchanged or sclfidentical characteristic amidst change in other characteristics of the person. The mapping f that transforms each point x of a set X to a point f(x)
within X can be understood as sorne process of change in the person
understood in terms of a set of that person's characteristics X. The fixed
point x· that is transformed to itself, so that f(x') = x', can be understood
as that unchanging or self-identical characteristic of the person that allows
us to say that the person exists despite change in other characteristics.
From this perspective, philosophical personal identity analysis that
focuses on personal continuity by re-identifying the individual in sorne
way is a form of existence analysis, and philosophical theories that aim to
demonstrate personal identity could be said aim to demonstrate the existence of the person much as fixed point theorems aim to demonstrate the
existence of an equilibrium set of prices or n-tuple strategies. The suggests two conclusions, the first pertaining to economics and the second
to philosophy.
First, if we are to say, based on the application of fixed point theorems, that an economy exists when represented as a system of equations,
then extending that same fixed point logic to the personal identity of economic agents requires that we also demonstrate that the agents in that
economy exist when represented in terms of collections of characteristics. That is, contrary to standard thinking in economics, economic equilibrium depends not just upon demonstrating the existence of a set of
equilibrium prices oran equilibrium point of n-tuple strategies, but also
on demonstrating the existence of market agents themselves. Note, then,
that on the standard neoclassical conception of the individual, while nonidentity preserving change occurs in one set of individual characteristics
as individual pre-trade endowments are transformed into post-trade commodities the individual holds, the individual's preferences- which are

3. Also see Leonurd 1!9'121lorJohn \"on :-o:eum11nn's originnl upplicnrion of tixed point methods ro gnmes.
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normally taken as unchanging - can be construed as that particular characteristic of the individual which acts as a self-identical fixed point assuring the individual's existence. While 1 have argued that this implicit
account of personal identity is not successful, nonetheless it may be
construed as offering such an account (Da vis {2003c), chap. 3 ], thus creating the paralld between existence proofs and identity arguments in economics.
Second, the comparison between· fixed point theorems and personal
identity analysis offers an important insight into how we might think
about the latter in economics. To say that a fixed point x· is transformed
to itsdf, or that f(x·) = x· , is to characterize x· in sdf-identical, reflexive
terms. That is, in all transformations, x· always reproduces itself and only
itself. Thus a personal identity analysis understood specifically in fixed
point terms would explain the existence of the person or individual in
terms of one specific type of characteristic, namely, one exhibiting reflexivity. Put somewhat differently, what would be unchanging about individual economic agents amidst change in their other characteristics is a
characteristic of individuals that exhibits their self-reference. Much existing personal identity analysis in philosophy, however, ignores reflexivity
and self-reference, and simply focuses on various individual characteristics that might be thought to be unchanging, for example, such as that a
person might always have psychological continuity. Applying fixed point
thinking to the identity of individual economic agents, however, leads us
to rather interpret unchangingness specifically in reflexive terms. Thus,
to make use of this different perspective, 1 apply it in the conclusion to
section four in which collective intentionality analysis is applied to the
Kirman's network conception of the individual.

II. Complex Economic Networks: Kirman's
Marseille Fish Market Analysis
Complexity in economics can be defined in the broadest sense in terms
of economic systems in which endogenous processes do not lead asymptotically to fixed points, limit cycles, or explosions (Day (1994)]. A narrower view of economics complexity may be set forth in terms of the
following [Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997); cf. Rosser (2004)]: (1) dis-
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persed interaction among heterogeneous agents acting locally; (2) no global controller able to exploit all opportunities or interactions in the economy; (3) cross-cutting hierarchical organization with tangled
inteructions; (4) continua! adaptation by learning and evolving agents;
(5) perpetua! novelty with new markets, technologies, behaviors, institutions that create new niches in the ecology of economic systems; (6) outof-equilibrium dynamics with zero or many equilibria and the system
unlikely to be near a global optimum. Economic networks, finally, are
one type of complex economic system based on this narrower type of
view.
Economic networks have been investigated by both economists und
economic sociologists [cf. Rauch and Casella (2001)], and though they
understand networks in different ways, broadly speaking economic networks, or the "network form of organization," may be defined as "any
collection of actors (N~2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one unother and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during
the exchange" [Podolny and Page (1998), p. 59]. Economic networks
m ay also be classified in various ways, such as whether they involve concentrated or patterned forms of exchange [Zuckerman (2003), p. 551].
Generally, however, networks are seen as a departure from atomistic trading relationships in that individuals show a preference for trading with
certain other individuals rather than engaging in arm's length type of
trade characteristic of comperitive markets. From a price theory point of
view, this difference is significant in that it generates distinct patterns of
trade, prices, and other economic variables different from what it holds
for competitive markets.
1 treat Kirman's Marseille fish market analysis as a paradigm example
of the economic network, concentruted exchange conception, because
of its focus on minimal interaction in the form of pairwise combinations
of individual buyers and sellers.4 The analysis is also valuable in virtue of
its empirical foundation in extensive evidence regarding buyer-seller
interactions over a period of time.~ In addition, the fish market case repre4. Albnn Bouvier comments that one might focus on 'local exchange S) stems' in which certain communities
play a central role in loyal trade relutionships. For example. in Marseille and elsewhere the l\lonrid community !Muslim Senegalesel play such a role. One advnntage of this appronch is that it pinces indi,·iduuls in an

historical community, ond thus deepens the analysis of their moti\'es. ~ly discussion. howe\·er. is rr-stricted to
the case of individnals not apparently attached to such communities.
~- The data nm from.Januury !, 1988 to.Jnne 30, 1991, and include a total of 237,162 transuctions between
buyers and sellen.
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sents an especially simple market type in that with a perishable product
there are essentially no stocks to carry over from one da y to the next, so
that the basic mechanics of the market and their results can be isolated
and effectively frozen ata point in time.b Finally, the market application
itself is particularly important as a framework in which to examine the
network conception of interactive individuals since clearly individuals in
markets are relatively autonomous, whereas it can be argued that individuals in !iOcial groups such as firms and households are submerged in an
interaction with one another that makes the group the relevant agent.
Thus the market setting arguably provides an ideal framework for assessing whether network interaction offers a new way of understanding individuals that is alternative to the standard atomistic conception.
What, then, are Kirman's main results? First, the evidence marshalled
from the Marseille market is inconsistent with the idea that the "behavior one observes in the aggregate in such markets corresponds to sorne
enlarged version of the behavior of the individual in the classical competitive market" [Kirman (2001 ), p. 159).7 Second, while down-sloping
demand curves obtain for individual kinds of fish at the aggregate leve!,
these markets are organized in such a way that considerable price dispersion precludes their being regarded as 'single price' type competitive
markets [Hiirdle and Kirman, (1995)]. This distribution in prices can be
explained by a process in which individual traders strike bargains among
themselves that permit sellers to discriminare between buyers, with successive prices being charged for the same kind of fish to different buyers
differing by as muchas 30 percent [Kirman and Vignes (1991)) . Does
the market, thus understood, exhibir equilibrium characteristics? Since
tests for the stability of the resulting price distribution turn out to exhibir a high degree of constancy over time [Hardle and Kirman (1995)] , it
seems fair to say that the market does achieve sorne sort of equilibrium,
if not one that is characterizable in classical competitive terms.
How, then, does the market actually get organized? What was observed in the pattern of trading r~lationships in the Marseille market is that
"On the one hand, there are buyers who regularly huy from the same seller and are extremely loyal, and on the other hand, there are people who
shift between sellers all the time" [Kirman (2001) , p. 177]. Since individuals who participare in such trading relationships appear not to behave

ó. TI>is additionully ullows chunges in supply 10 be considertd the outcnme of a stochuslic process.

l . This hud been thenreticully demonstruted in the SMD results [Kirman 119891).
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as optimizing agents, at least in the standard way, Kirman propases rhat
we say individuals use simple rules ro make their choices, and rhat trading relationships then emerge from a random marching process rhut
operares between buyers and sellers who are aware of each others' iJentities. This situarían was subsequently modeled in such a way asto simulare buyers developing relationships with sellers on the basis of previous
experience, where their probability of re-visiting sellers depends on profit received from past visits [Kirman and Vriend (2000) ; Weisbuch,
Kirman , and Herreiner (2000)]. The framework employedinvolves a type
of leaming process known as reinforcement leaming commonly used by
psychologists and evolutionary and experimental economists. 8 Basically
what rhe modeling shows is that the stronger the reinforcement mechanism or parameter, all other things equal, the more likely it is that buyerseller loyalty relationships will emerge.
One interesting aspect of buyer-seller loyalty relationships Kirman
emphasizes is that the behavior of the class of buyers is highly bimodal:
they either remain quite loyal to particular sellers or they continually visir
many sellers.9 lt also turns out that 90 percent of both buyers and sellers
get a higher profit when dealing with their loyal counterparts. This is
interesting in that loyal buyers pay higher prices than those that visit
many sellers. But loyai· buyers still earn higher profits, beca use sellers
learn to give them priority in service. 10 As loyal sellers earn higher profit,
then, the market does not function as a zero sum game. As the volume of
transactions that goes through loyalty networks increases, the returns to
the participants increases. We might take this to reflect the idea that the
relation between the individual leve! and the market leve! is complex,
where in contrast to the standard W alrasian strategy of aggregating across
independent individuals, the way in which the market is organized
mediares and complicares this relationship. The modeling strategy described ubove provides one view of this complexity in its reliance on learning and reinforcement as dynamic, endogenous processes that generare
loyalty matching. In the following section, 1 attempt to go behind this
reinforcement mechanism analysis to explain how buyer-seller loyalty
relationships might be understood in terms of individuals forming shared intentions regarding loyal trade.

8. Soe Kirman (ClOOIJ, pp. 178-179) lor refercnces.
9. E.g .• 4H percent of al buyers bought 95 percent of th<ir cod from one seller.

lO. Buyers earn profits on re-s;~le.
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III. Collective intentionality analysis and
complex individual behavior
Collective intentionalíty analysis examines first person plural intentions
(that the individual expresses in 'we' language) as opposed to the more
traditionally investigated first person singular intentions (that the individual expresses in 'I' language). What sets the former apart from the larter is their stronger success conditions. While individuals can express
first person singular intentions in a relatively autonomous manner, being
constrained mostly by the need to only communicate effectively, an individual's first person plural intentions implicare others to whom the 'we'
applíes, and are thus additionally constrained by the requirement that
these other individuals in sorne manner agree to the content of the individual's we-intention. Thus, following the widely accepted analysis of
conventions [Lewis (1969)], we-intentions have been explained by sorne
contributors as iterated sets of reciproca! attitudes between individuals
who are said to share a given we-intention [Tuomela (1995)]. When an
individual expresses a we-intention she generally believes that those other
individuals to whom her expressed 'we' assertion applies would largely
agree with her assertion. But she also believes that they believe she believes
this, that they believe she believes that they believe this, etc., so that the
reciproca! attitudes in question across the individuals concemed constitute an iterative, many-layered set of reciproca! attitudes, such as are
employed in game theory's common knowledge assumption. 11
lt is important to emphasize that collective intentionality analysis is
'individualístic' in the sense that individuals have we-intentions rather
than groups of individuals, so that any reference toa 'group intention' is
merely a shorthand way of referring to a structure of reciproca! attitudes
across separare individuals who happen to share and agree to sorne weintention. Strictly speaking, only individuals have intentions. Different
individuals, of course, can express the same we-intention, but in each
instance that shared intention is decomposable into a set of reciproca!
individual intentions. Note, then, that while the scope of 1-intentions is
basically the independent individual, that is, the single individual's own
plans, even if they apply to others, the scope of we-intentions is those
plans that the individual shares with other individuals. We might ucear11. 1 put usid~ non -typicol cases of cleceitful use of 'wc'languoge and expression o f u·e·intentions. 1 olso ignore
\\'heth~r
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dingly say that whereas an older holistic type of reasoning tends to explain
individuals as social beings by subsuming individuals in social relationships, collective intentionality analysis rather explains individuals as social
beings by subsuming social relationships in individuals.
A fair question is how does the treatment of individuals in collective
intentionality analysis differ from rheir treatment in traditional economics thinking about individuals. Thus on sorne especially strong methodological individualist interpretations of the latter individuals alone real! y
exist and social groups are regarded as constructions or mere concepts. 12
But other views of the individual in economics either allow that non-individual, group-type agents exist - such as firms, unions, households,
governments whose behavior does not need to be decomposed into or
reduced to the behavior of their members - or are agnostic about whether individuals alone exist. Similarly, contributors to collective intentionality analysis vary in their views from supposing only jndividuals exist
to allowing that social groups exist as well. In this paper 1 seek to put
these ontological issues aside in order to provide an account of the individual alternative to the standard one in economics that sees individuals
as always concerned strictly with their own welfare. The paper consequently asks whether network analysis may be interpreted to include a
conception of individuals as distinct and re-identifiable, irrespective of
whether pairs of individuals in loyalty relations also constitute supra-individual agents. My own view happens to be that both groups of individuals and single individuals can be economic agents, but 1 do not pursue
this matter here.
Of the recent contributors to collective intentionality analysis, in this
paper 1 draw on Gilbert who has focused on pairwise shared intentions
as one paradigm case [Gilbert ( 1989), 1996)]. 13 One of Gilbert's favorite
exa~ples is of two individuals going for a walk together. On the one
hand, it is odd to treat only two individuals as akin to a group. lndeed
there are important differences between pairs of individuals forming shared intentions and the way that shared intentions are formed in groups
of many individuals. But on the other hand, the two-individual case clearly
exhibits how individuals can share non-personal intentions- a matter
central to their importance. Moreover, the small-scale, informal nature
of the case can be compared to the scale of interaction involved in the
12. "Society, alter oU, is jusi o convenient labd for the totality of indi\'iduals" [Arrou·ll98-ll, p. 80].
13 . For R collecth•c intenrionality bibliography. ~ hup·/ /uyu• belsjnki ti/%7Epyljkgsk/collim/. f'or a dif.
ferent opplicolion of collecth·e intentionulity analysis,..., Dads 1200lol.
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matching process Kirman uses to model buyers and sellers in the fish
market. Whereas social interaction is often explained by sociologists and
others in conncction with enduring social groups possessing complex
forms of organization understood in terms of institutions and norms, in
this instance we have social interaction that may be seen as elementary
and informal in natute. Might two individuals, then. find themselves on
a walk together by accident, that is, unintentionally? Gilbert thinks not,
and explains the case of two individuals taking a walk together by saying
that a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be a walk they take together is that it be common knowledge between them that they each intend
to take a walk together, where this common knowledge concems a shared goal, and where their having this shared goal entitles us to regard the
two separare individuals as a "plural subject" [Gilbert (1996), p. 179].
This plural subject is nonetheless still made up out of two distinct individuals who are linked together only with respect to whatever particular
shared we-intentions they happen to have.
It is important to emphasize that Gilbert supposes that two people
may constitute a plural subject with a shared goal without each individual also having that goal as a personal goal. H That is, an individual may
be attached toa shared goal that is not necessarily in the individual's own
goal or interest. What this possible tension between individual and shared goals brings out is that individual involvement in a plural subject and
shared goals is founded on the formation of a joint commitment. In other
words, when two individuals' personal goals may be at odds with their
shared goals, each must be committed - jointly committed - to sustaining the latter vis-a-vis the former. Commitment thus understood is a
normative concept in that it includes an idea of obligation, though as
commitments themselves vary in character, so joint commitments can
vary in character from the moral to the pragmatic. Thus in sorne cases
having a joint commitment can imply that individuals have moral rights
and obligations stemming from their shared goals, while in other cases
having a joint commitment can simply be based on prudential or pragmatic considerations without any moral connotation. Ordinary experience, of course, is often ambiguous in this respect, and indeed so much
so that individuals with shared commitments may disagree asto whether
their basis is moral or prudential. Similarly, apart from the question of
their basis, the degree of bindingness individuals perceive to attach to
14. E.g., '" \\·~ may. as a body. accept the goal of impro,•ing our depurlmenl's sturus in th.: unh·enily, without
each of us hu,·ing the imprO\·ement uf our departm~nfs status as o1 pe11i00 11l goal" [Gilbert 11996), p. 2 .
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shared commitments can also vary. But in any event Gilbert seems to be
right in saying that shared goals involve commitment and sorne form of
obligation. 1 take this difference between shared goals and personal goals
to be especially important for thinking about behavior in economics,
because it shows us how individual behavior in circumstances of shared
intentionality has a non-instrumental or, we might say, deontological character in contrast to standard treatment of individual behavior in economics where individuals are seen to act exclusively in instrumental terms.
Suppose, then, that individual behavior in economic life is understood
both instrumentally, or in terms of individual goals, and deontologically,
or in terms of individuals' shared goals, and that the balance between
these two types of behavior is seen to be determined empirically in terms
of the extent of each of these types of goals and behavior in the sum total
of individual activities. One way this might be captured is by determining the extent to which 1-intentions and we-intentions are expressed in
normal speech in different spheres of activity. This would then be a way
of treating individual behavior as complex in not being subject toa single
type of explanation, but rather as alternately employing incommensu. rabie sorts of decision-making procedures according to relevant circumstances. In terms of trading relationships involving concentra red exchange
as in the Marseille fish market, individual behavior, then, might be characterized as complex in that individuals act instrumentally in circumstances in which they move from seller to seller, but deontologically when
loyalty dictates repeated transactions with particular sellers. The learning-reinforcement analysis which Kirman employs to explain these
loyalty relationships could then be said to constitute a summary or externa! representation of the effects of individual decision-making to then be
further explained in terms of whether individuals adopt shared goals and
express shared we-intentions regarding continuing transactions. 15
Note that Kirman explains complexity somewhat differently than this
when he says that the relationship between individuals and markets is
complex in virtue of the way in which the latter's organization media tes
and complica tes the way individuals relate to one another to produce the
outcomes that explain the aggregate leve! of the market. The view of complex behavior above, however, is actually quite similar to what is suggested in the previous paragraph. Joint commitments, of course, are a form
U. Also note that in contrast to Kim1on's an;tlysis which sets out to explnin hu\\· simple m les generate a ll"otr·
ning process which m~uches certain lmyers and sellers. the o1rgument here puts this dynJmic emphusis uside
to characterize loyahy :ts .m omcome. howe\·er ;Jchie\'ed.
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of aggregative behavior. So just as for Kirman market behavior complicares and mediares individual behavior, joint commitment behavior as
deontologically rational complicares and mediares instrumentally rutional individual behavior. Collective intentionality analysis, however, brings
an emphasis to this understanding of complexity that it seems should not
be overlooked, namely, its individualist character. Whereas the juxtapo·
sing of individuals and aggregative relationships that markets reflect suggests a juxtaposing of individualist and holist ontologies, collective
intentionality analysis, as noted above, puts the social into the individual
vía the way in which we-intentions operute. lt is consequently fully individualist in nature- so ontologicully more simple- while ut the same sufficient to explain complexity for individuals in social settings. But this
leaves the question of whether the conception of the individual in network theory is itself viable in terms of satisfying basic identity requirements appropriate to think.ing about individuals. I turn to this issue in
the following section.

N. Individuation and re-identification of interactive individuals
First, then, supposing that individuals who develop loyalties to one ano·
ther in networks and concentrated exchange form joint commitments
understood in collective intentionality terms, can those individuuls still
be seen to be distinct and independent from one another - thus satisfying the individuation test? Applying the individuation test to the conception of individuals in networks now understood in the collective
intentionality terms is a mutter of usk.ing whether such individuuls using
'we' lunguage somehow distinguish themselves from one another in the
process of doing so. I huve urgued more generally thut 'sociully embedded individuals' can be understood to distinguish themselves as independent individuals if one attends to the way in which they interact with
others in the process of using 'we' lunguuge, und I essentially summarize
that urgument here [Davis (2003c), ch. 7]. When individuals form joint
commitments, und use 'we' language in doing so, they bind themselves
to whutever they believe others take to be implied by the use of that languuge. At the same time, it should be emphasized, they bind themselves
to such implicutions voluntarily, since their use of thut lunguage is intentionul, und one cannot suy that something that is intentional is involuntary. This combination of bindingness and voluntariness, then, might be
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said to involve individuals 'self-imposing' u pon themselves whatever their
collective intentions imply. Only an individual can 'self-impose' something upon himself or herself. Others cannot 'self-impose' on another
individual, but can only 'impose' upon an individual, and then in a munner contrary to that individual's intentions. Thus the use of \ve' languuge
involves individuals being both 'sociully embedded' in networks and yet
also being distinct vis-a-vis others at one and the same time. That is, loyal
individuals who are linked together in networks are npnetheless independent and distinct individuals, and moreover are so specifically in virtue of their relationships to others to whom they are loyal.
This conclusion is consistent with the general framework developed in
the first section above as being uppropriate for understanding agent identity in economics, numely, the fixed-point framework of equilibrium
proofs in economics. That is, just as fixed-point proofs depend on the
idea of there being one self-identical or retlexive relutionship to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium, so here also the existence of (distinct)
individuals depends u pon there being one self-identical or reflexive relationship that individuals possess. Or, along with all the relationships individuals have to others, there is also that unique relationship individuuls
have to themselves in their being uble to 'self-impose' joint commitments
upon themselves in the use of \ve' language in interaction with others.
This unique relationship accordingly explains individual existen ce essentially on the same model as fixed-point theorems explain equilibrium
existence.
Second, then, can individuals in networks understood in this way to
be distinct and independent from one another also be thought to be reidentifiable as such through a process of change- thus satisfying the reidentification test? Kirman's evidence from the Marseille fish market
covers a period of three anda half years, and it is fair to ask whether individuals who are distinct and independent in virtue of their ability to form
loyalty relationships to one another eventually lose their distinctness over
time. as they perhaps become 'oversocialized' [Granovetter (1985)] or
hubituated to these sorts of ties. Does loyalty, that is. ultimately become
habitual, consequently submersing individuals in the bonds they form to
others? Note that according to Kirman's evidence at any one time not all
buyers and sellers enter into loyalty relutionships. but sorne rather shop
around. and behave in un instrumentully rational way, so that there are
always two classes of individuals, loyal traders and 'free' traders.
Moreover, while the network conception requires that relative sizes of
the two classes of individuals in the Marseille fish market remain relati-
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vely the same over time, this does not imply that the memberships of
these two classes remains constant over time. All individuals, we might
then suppose, not only actas loyal traders on sorne occasions, but also as
'free' traders on other occasions. Further, it also makes sense to suppose
that individuals in the capacity of loyal traders might vary the trading
particular partners to whom they are loyal, if not perhaps as frequently
as 'free' traders change their trading partners.
What this all suggests is that in markets in which loyalty networks develop individuals need not necessarily become habituated to trading with
always the same individuals. To the contrary, variability in the membership of the two classes and in loyalty relationships themselves would seem
to involve individuals needing to continually re-learn or re-establish the
conditions of loyal trade. That is, individuals would only have the sense
that they are 'self-imposing' their shared commitments upon themselves
if they were continually able to perceive loyalty as a departure from the
'free' trade case. This, however, is just what is required for us to be able
to say that individuals are re-identifiable in terms of what makes them
distinct individuals - namely this capacity for imposing commitments
upon oneself- and thus that the network conception of the interactive
individual meets the re-identification test. In terms of the pairwise formulation which Kirman investigares - and for which Gilbert explains
shared intentions - individuals who rely on loyalty relationships in trade
are distinct and re-identifiable through change in the varying pattern of
those relationships.

V. Individual identity and equilibrium as
conjoint properties of economic systems
Section one above noted the parallel structure of personal identity arguments and fixed point proofs of equilibrium existen ce. T aking personal
identity arguments to be existence proofs for individuals, it thus seems
reasonable to suppose that adequate analysis of an economic system ought
to explain existence of equilibrium and individuals as simultaneously
obtaining. Or, an economic system should not be thought to be in equilibrium if existence can be attributed to the system as a whole while it cannot be attributed to the individuals who occupy it. Recall that the 1970s
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results, or SMD theory, bring standard
economics' methodological individualist microfoundations approach into
question by demonstrating that a pre-given conception of the individual
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as an atomistic being renders aggregate excess dcmands arbitrary. lt is
also argued in Davis (2003b) that this same pre-given conception of the
individual does not satisfy an identity test evaluation needed to attribute
existence to individuals on that conception. Thus from both vantage points
the standard view of the individual is problematic beca use of its attachment to a questionable conception of the individual.
Network theory rather begins by explaining individual and aggregate
behavior as mutually influencing, and thereby abandons the notion that
individuals can be explained in a pre-given way apart from their interaction with one another. Put differently, it gives up the notion that one can
develop aggregative relationships out of individualist microfoundations,
and rather seeks to explain economic systems in terms of mutually consistent conceptions of the individual and the market. The collective intentionality interpretation in this paper of loyalty relationships in Kirman's
Marseille fish market case thus treats individual and market as consistent
with one another by explicitly making the economy's 'microfoundations'
social-individual, where this is a marter of incorporaring social dimensions
in individual behavior. Aggregate econonúc behavior, as seen in the stability of a large share of the market being carried out by loyal buyers and sellers, is then explained in terms of an underlying social-individual economic
behavior, as seen in individuals repeatedly forming joint commitments to
one another as buyers and sellers. Thus equilibrium existence and individual existence simultaneously obtain, and are mutually influencing.
This paper began with a skeptical question: if there is not a way for us
to understand how individuals retain a status as distinct agents, might it
not be better that economics regard social groups as economic agents,
and give up its long-standing attention to individuals? The answer to this
question can now be seen to be negative, since on the view that individual and aggregate behavior are mutually influencing, a comprehensive
explanaion of an economic system still requires an explanation of individual behavior, albeit one different than employed in the standard view of
the individual in economics.
In dosing, note that the discussion in this paper does not explain the
mutual influence of individuals a~d markets or aggregative behavior upon
one another dynamically or in terms of it comes about, but rather only as
an outcome. lt is fair to say, however, that the pathways individuals follow to loyalty rdationships are also important for understanding the nature
of those relationships. Thus, since an important emphasis in network
theory generally is on seeing economies as complex adaptive systems in
which indivi.duals undergo a series of adjustments to arrive at certain out-
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comes, a further development of the analysis here could be thought to
involve developing an explanation of how individuals Icarn to form joint
commitments to trade with specific partners, to whom they are then loyal.
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Résumé
Une approche particuliere de l'analyse des économies vu~s comme des
systemes complexes étudie l'interaction entre les individus dans des
réseaux locaux ou de voisinage qui sont un sous-ensemble des économies plus larges. En rejetant la vision traditionnelle des fondations microéconomiques de la relation entre le comportement économique individue!
et agrégé, les approches des réseaux expliquent le comportement individue! et agrégé comme s'influen~ant réciproquement. Ce papier étudie la
conception des réseaux de l'individu interactif utilisée dans l'analyse
d' Alan Kirman (200 1) dans le cadre de relations de loyauté entre les acheteurs et les vendeurs sur le marché aux poissons de Marseille, en utilisant
le cadre du test d'identité que j'ui appliqué précédemment ala conception atomistique standard de l'individu [Davis (2003c)]. Pour ce faire, le
papier interprete l'individu interactif dans les termes de l'analyse de l'intention collecúve et d'engagements communs te! qu'ils ont été considé-

Revue De pHILOSOPHie écoNOffilc;>Ue

133

John B. DAvrs

rés par Margaret Gilbert. ll donne alors en premier lieu une explication
sur la form¡¡tion par les acheteurs et vendeurs d'engagements communs,
tout restant quand meme des individus distincts, et, deuxiemement, argumente qu'a travers le temps les individus ainsi compris peuveryt également etre reidentifiés comme des etre distincts. Le papier montre ainsi
que le cadre d'analyse des réseaux présente une approche pertinente des
individus compris en termes de relations sociales qui émergent au travers
d'engagements communs.
Mots-clés : systemes économiques complexes, réseaux locaux, conception interactive de l'individu, marché de poissons de Marseille, loyauté,
test d'identité, engagement commun.
Abstract

One approach to the analysis of economies as complex systems investigares interaction between individuals in local networks or neighborhoods
that are subsets of larger economies. Rejecting the traditional microfoundations view of the relation between individual and aggregate economic
behavior, network approaches explain individual and aggregate behavior
as mutually influencing. This paper investigares the network conception
of the interactive individual as employed in Alan Kirman's (2001) analysis of loyalty relationships between buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish
market using the identity test framework I previously applied to the standard atomistic conception of the individual [Davis (2003c)]. To do so,
the paper interprets the interactive individual in terms of collective intentionality analysis and joint commitments, as understood by Margaret
Gilbert. It then, first, gives an explanation of how buyers and sellers can
form joint commitments and yet still remain distinct individuals, and,
second, argues that over time individuals thus understood can also be reidentified as distinct individuals. The paper thus presents the network
framework as offering a viable account of individuals understood in terms
of social relationships that emerge out of joint commitments.
Key Words: complex economic systems, local networks, interactive individual conception, Marseille fish market, loyalty, identity tests, collcctive
intentionality, joint commitments.
ClassificationJEL: Al2, B31, B41, D50
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